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Thursday - 19 February 1970

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25X1 4. [] In a chance encounter, Senator Margaret Chase Smith said she would appreciate an Agency situation briefing in the near future and would be in touch with us.

25X1 5. [] During a brief conversation, Senator J. W. Fulbright commented (in his usual facetious fashion) that in the current hearings on Southeast Asia he was "learning a lot of things he never knew before" including the fact that "you folks seem to be doing the work of the Lord out there."

25X1 6. [] George Murphy, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy staff, asked whether in view of the unavailability of Senator Pastore on Tuesday, 3 March, the Director's appearance could be put over until Wednesday, 4 March at 10:00 a.m. I said I would check with the Director and let him know.

25X1 7. [] Met with Frank Slatinshek, House Armed Services Committee staff, whom I briefed on the Middle East situation, developments in Laos, and recent Soviet missile tests.

Slatinshek asked some questions about what the Soviets, Japanese and Chinese Communists were doing in the field of using high-voltage electronic microscopes in the development of micro-miniaturized computers. He said he had been told recently by [] the Fermi Institute at the University of Chicago, that the Soviets, Japanese and ChiComs were working intensively in this connection, using a powerful microscope "in reverse" to develop micro-miniaturized computer circuits and that this technology might be important in weapons application. Slatinshek was concerned that this might result in a major breakthrough in weaponry, particularly with regard to the ABM. I said I would consult with the experts and report back.

25X1A 25X1A 8. [] After checking with [] [] WH Division, I called Jay Sourwine, Senate Internal Security Subcommittee staff, and told him that the list of names that had been left out of the Castro testimony was inadvertent and that it is all right to include them for publication.

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25X1 5. [] Talked with Ed Braswell, on the staff of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, about the SI and TK security clearances
25X1 held by [] who has come to the Committee staff from the Bureau
of the Budget. Braswell indicated that [] was occupying a slot on the
Preparedness Subcommittee staff but would be working directly for him
25X1 (Braswell) on revisions of the law relating to military procurement. He
said it was possible that Senator Stennis would want [] to sit in on an
occasional hearing in the SI-TK category and asked if we could continue
25X1 [] clearances if we had no objection. I told Braswell I saw no reason
why this could not be done.

25X1 6. [] Talked with Bill Woodruff, on the staff of the
Senate Appropriations Committee, who asked if we would get for him the
25X1A order-of-battle figures which were included in [] briefing on Laos
last week. I told him I would be glad to do this.

25X1A Woodruff also asked if I would mention to John Clarke Woodruff's
interest in getting our total intelligence effort dollar figure when it was
available. I have passed this on to [] of OPPB.

25X1 7. [] Jim Gehrig, Chief Counsel, Senate Space Com-
mittee, called and said he would like to meet with Dave Brandwein at his
convenience early next week for a briefing which would bring him up-to-date
on Soviet space activity. He said he would also like to have Bill Parker and
Craig Voorhees, of his staff, attend if this was agreeable. Gehrig said that
he could come to Headquarters for the briefing. I will check with Mr.
Brandwein on this.

25X1 8. [] Scott Cohen, on the staff of Senator Charles
Percy (R., Ill.), called and requested a briefing on the Soviet and Chinese
missile threat for Senators Cooper and Percy and Bill Miller, of Cooper's
staff, and himself for their background use in connection with the upcoming
ABM debate. I told Cohen I could foresee problems on this because it has
been the Director's practice to limit briefings in these special briefing
categories to members and committee staff personnel designated by the
Chairman of their committee after mutual agreement with the Director.
I told Cohen I would raise the question however and be back in touch.

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ATAM

U.S. Satellites Detect Soviet ICBM's in Medium-Range Missile Complexes

By WILLIAM BEECHER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 10 — The Soviet Union has started to deploy its principal long-range missile in complexes that previously consisted only of medium-range missiles pointed at Western Europe, according to well placed United States Government sources.

About 75 SS-11 intercontinental ballistic missiles have been installed in two places in southwestern Russia, apart from other long-range missile sites, the sources say.

Nixon Administration officials are debating the possible implications of this puzzling development.

The SS-11 is generally comparable to the American Minuteman missile in that it can carry a one megaton warhead

6,000 miles or more. But it is being emplaced in firing complexes that heretofore have housed missiles with ranges of 1,000 miles to 2,000 miles.

A debate, involving officials in key government agencies, offers explanations ranging from efficiency and economy to strategic considerations.

The main schools of thought appear to be the following:

Many of the 700 Soviet medium-range missiles are not well protected against surprise attack. Substituting the tested and relatively cheap SS-11 liquid-fuel missile, with its steel and concrete silo, would be less expensive and more effective than designing a wholly new medium-range missile.

By installing the SS-11's which could be used against close-in targets in Europe or long-range targets in the United States, the Russians would

achieve a flexible dual-capability weapons system.

The Russians may have hoped to slip some long-range missiles into medium-range sites undetected, thus achieving an advantage if current arms control talks were limited to "known" long-range missile sites.

Classification Reviewed

So far the intelligence community lists these SS-11's as medium-range missiles, but that classification is under review.

Aside from this deployment, the Russians continued last year to deploy nearly 200 SS-11's, along with about 60 larger SS-9's and a handful of solid-fuel SS-13's in traditional long-range missile sites farther north and east.

If the 75 SS-11's in medium-range sites and a roughly comparable number of launchers in

training centers are added to all other long-range missiles, officials say, the Russians are now believed to be approaching a total of 1,500, almost 50 per cent more than the 1,054 American land-based Minuteman and Titan-2 missiles.

However, the United States still has a lead—656 to about 250—in submarine-based missiles.

Thus, in missile numbers, the two countries now are in a position of parity. And the United States still maintains a lead in long-range bombers—450 to 150.

It is because of this surge in Soviet missile construction that many Administration leaders are eager to negotiate a slowdown or halt in the missile race when talks on the limitation of strategic arms resume on April 16 in Vienna.

The first evidence that the

Russians were constructing SS-11 sites in medium-range missile complexes was uncovered by reconnaissance satellites last fall.

Government sources say it is not absolutely clear whether these SS-11's are being added to the missiles at the two sites or whether they are replacing older, more vulnerable missiles. Some officials suggest there is reason to believe the latter is the case.

Test Firings Noted

The intelligence community has noted some test firings of the SS-11, within the Soviet Union, at ranges short of 2,000 miles.

From the southerly sites, the SS-11 could reach, besides targets in Western Europe, most of the northern half of the United States. This would include the biggest cities and most Minuteman sites.

Officials say that in the preliminary missile talks in Helsinki the Russians asked that their medium-range missiles should be excluded from detailed discussions on strategic limitations on the ground that these weapons did not threaten United States territory.

American negotiators insisted that they be included, partly because Washington has assured the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that weapons limitations would include systems that threatened Western Europe.

Installation of SS-11 missiles among medium-range missiles complicates this matter, officials say.

"If asked, the Russians might say that these missiles have been modified so they can't be fired at intercontinental range," one source said, "but we have to assume they can."

Soviet Satellite Destroyer Is Believed to Be in Orbit

Cosmos 248, Launched in 1968, Reported to Have Intercepted 2 Craft in Tests —Similar U.S. System Doubted

By RICHARD D. LYONS

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 5 — American and British space experts believe that the Soviet Union has built and successfully tested a satellite capable of intercepting and destroying other orbiting spacecraft.

From tracking data gathered on Soviet spacecraft and from secret intelligence reports, these experts have deduced that 18 months ago the Russians launched an "interceptor-inspector-destroyer" satellite, officially named Cosmos 248, which homed in on two other members of the Cosmos class, 249 and 252, and somehow destroyed them.

The United States Air Force prepared plans for such a satellite 11 years ago but the United States is not believed to have such an orbital attack system in operation.

The Air Force does have some Thor missiles in the Pacific that are capable of being fired

at satellites. They have the disadvantage, however, of a limited range, perhaps 150 miles. Thus, for the rockets to reach their targets, the targets would have to fly directly above the missile sites, or quite near them.

This means that an effective defense against satellites built on the ground would have to have many missile-launching sites throughout the world. In addition, such ground-based missiles would need a long range since it would be possible to maneuver a satellite into orbits 1,000 miles or more above the

Radars of the United States Air Force, which track Soviet satellites almost from the moment they leave their launch pads, originally saw the two Cosmos target satellites and their carrier rockets in orbit.

According to officially published reports, the radars later detected 25 pieces of each spacecraft, indicating that an explosion had occurred.

The experts noted that the explosions, which could have been caused by small onboard missiles with conventional warheads such as the Sidewinder type, occurred about the time that the target spacecraft were near Cosmos 248, which is still circling the earth.

For more than a year, it is said, the Russians successfully masked the tests by conducting them while public attention and private radars were focused on the United States' first three-man flight, Apollo 7, and on the Soyuz 3 rendezvous mission, which was the Soviet Union's first manned flight in 18 months. Both flights took place in October, 1968.

The possibility that such an orbital satellite-destroyer system could be developed was believed to have arisen at the talks on limiting strategic arms held by the United States and the Soviet Union in Helsinki, Finland, late last year. According to unconfirmed reports, the preliminary discussions included a suggestion for agreement that neither country would interfere with the other's satellites.

When the United States Air Force prepared its plan 11 years ago, the orbital attack system was given the code name Saint, a contraction of "satellite inspection and interception satellite." When research and development started a decade ago, the Radio Corporation of America was given the role of prime contractor.

Blueprints for a satellite that could destroy, as well as intercept and inspect, were drawn up earlier but it is believed that they have been shelved. Technical experts in the aerospace industry, which would develop a system against satellites on Defense Department orders, have hinted that the Air Force, under a different code name, has revived the

interception and inspection program, without a destroyer capability.

An inspector-interceptor satellite would be launched into an orbit similar to that of the spacecraft to be investigated. It would be maneuvered on ground command, as Cosmos 248 was believed to have been, to make minor course changes before a rendezvous with the target. When they met, it would inspect the target satellite with television cameras and radiation detectors, and transmit the data to ground stations.

Intense secrecy surrounds both American and Soviet military space efforts. For example, neither side even reveals how much it spends on military satellites much less where the money goes.

Sources in the aerospace industry say, however, that a year before the Cosmos 248 flight the American intelligence networks knew that the Russians were working on a satellite destroyer.

One person who has discussed the Soviet program openly and has tried to call attention to it is Geoffrey E. Perry, the British space expert who first announced in 1966 that the Russians had been launching military spacecraft from a secret new base at Plesetsk, south of Archangel in northern European Russia. Mr. Perry is apparently the first person not connected with allied intelligence services to have detected the nature of the Soviet flights, as well as that of the Plesetsk base.

Deductions From Data

Mr. Perry is the headmaster of the grammar school in Kettering, Northamptonshire, where students used war surplus radio equipment to track the satellites launched from the base, which was then unknown. The collected data on the orbital paths was fed to a computer and the latitude and longitude were subsequently determined.

Mr. Perry said in a telephone interview from his home that flights "suggest that the Russians have developed an interceptor satellite."

"Cosmos 248 was approached by the two spacecraft, which were maneuvered into a similar orbit and then disintegrated," he added. "From this it is not unreasonable to assume that the Russians have added a destruction capability, in addition to interceptions."

One mysterious element of the rendezvous and destruction of the satellites is when the second blow was struck. Information published by the

National Aeronautics and Space Administration that was obtained from the Air Force Aerospace Defense Command, Cosmos 249 blew up within a day or so of its launching, Oct. 20, 1968, but data on the destruction of Cosmos 252 are less specific.

"The date that it did blow up is still classified," said a spokesman for the Aerospace Defense Command at Ent Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colo. All data on Soviet space launchings are sent there for correlation and analysis.

A 'New Wrinkle' Discerned

But information published by NASA here indicates that the explosion took place within two weeks of the launching of Cosmos 252, on Nov. 1, 1968. Cosmos 248 was launched Oct. 19 of that year.

Announcements from Moscow about the flights were even more sparse, with Tass, the Soviet press agency, merely

stating that the mission was aimed at "gathering data for Russia's space program."

An American observer of the Soviet space effort described the Cosmos flights as "an interesting new wrinkle."

"It's certainly not a bad inference to assume that the Russians have such an interception and destruction capability," he continued. "There has been such a potential since the first days of space flight."

He cautioned against becoming alarmed over the Soviet flights "because there is no sign that either side is going to destroy the other's satellites."

"After all," he added, "the world is filled with weapons that are not being used."

But, he continued: "If I were a Russian military planner I would want such a system on the shelf, knowing that it would work."

A second American space expert, who also asked that his identity not be made public, was somewhat more pessimistic about Soviet antisatellite efforts, which he said first had been detected in 1967.

"I am concerned about this too," he said. He noted that an antisatellite system could be employed against American reconnaissance satellites that fly over the Soviet Union daily, eavesdropping on radar and communications and taking photographs.

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9. [] Called Ed Braswell, Chief of Staff, Senate Armed Services Committee, for clarification of reports from DIA regarding their appearance before [] Committee on 29 January. Braswell said that on two separate occasions Secretary Laird had "tried to serve up Mr. Helms" as part of a joint CIA/DIA briefing on the strategic threat. Braswell speculated that Laird had tried to employ this device "to kick off his new ABM pitch." Braswell said Chairman Stennis had not accepted Laird's proposal, but at the opening of the DIA briefing on 29 January had sought to assure himself that the DIA briefing was based on material shared with CIA, and on agreed estimates.

Referring to the Director's 30 January appearance, Braswell said there was considerable interest in the tactical air situation in Europe and our Subcommittee might wish to call the Director back to discuss this problem at some future date.

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10. [] Called Russ Blandford, Chief Counsel, House Armed Services Committee, to say that in response to his question of 23 January the Agency had never received any firm warning from any Iranian officials regarding an imminent coup in Libya. I said the Shah and others had occasionally spoken of the instability of the old regime in Libya and Nasir might want to take advantage of the situation. However I said we had never received any information from the State Department or anyone else about a specific warning []

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11. [] Representative John O. Marsh called to say that he would like to discuss with me tomorrow a couple of items regarding his report to the Appropriations Committee Chairman on his recent trip to Southeast Asia. We agreed to meet, probably at my home, after the Lipscomb funeral services. []

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cc:
ER
O/DDCI

Mr. Houston; Mr. Goodwin
DDI DDS DDS&T
EA/DDP OPFB
Item 1 - WH Division []

JOHN M. MAURY
Legislative Counsel

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